MEMORANDUM

DATE: August 24, 2017
FROM: Issue One’s Policy and Programs Team
RE: Strengthening the U.S. Office of Government Ethics

The U.S. Office of Government Ethics (OGE) is the central ethics agency of the federal executive branch, tasked with providing leadership on ethics and oversight of executive branch programs that are designed to prevent and resolve conflicts of interest. Given the importance of having strong ethics rules for government leaders and federal employees, it is important to ensure that the agency is empowered so the public can be confident that their government operates under the highest ethical standards. This memorandum presents 10 key ideas for strengthening OGE.

INDEPENDENCE

- **Specify in legislation that the Director of OGE may only be terminated for cause**
  Currently, the Ethics in Government Act states that the Director of OGE serves a five-year term, but does not define when and how he or she may be removed. Clarifying that the Director can only be removed “for cause” would help ensure the agency’s independence and was recommended as early as 1983.

TRANSPARENCY AND CONSISTENCY

- **Authorize OGE to serve as a central clearinghouse for all ethics actions taken by designated agency ethics officials (DAEOs)**

  As the central agency in the ethics process, it makes sense to have OGE serve as a clearinghouse for ethics actions taken by DAEOs and their subordinates. Having decisions from various agencies side by side would promote transparency and consistency. Given modern technology, this would be a relatively low burden for OGE.

- **Authorize OGE to publish recusal agreements of high-ranking Senior Executive Service (SES) employees**

  When an executive branch agency grants an employee a waiver regarding a situation that raises criminal conflict of interest (CCOI) concerns, the agency makes the waiver public. The same should apply for when SES employees establish recusal agreements, detailing what government matters they will not participate in. Those agreements should be published by OGE as part of the central clearinghouse function noted above.
• Authorize OGE to impose specific standards for ethics training and mandate ethics training for all high-level executive branch officials within a certain amount of time after joining an administration

OGE has the authority to require that executive branch agencies offer ethics trainings (see 5 C.F.R. sec. 2638, subpart C) and sets very general requirements, but it does not detail specific standards for those trainings. Doing so would help ensure that all employees across the entire executive branch are receiving appropriate ethics training. Also, high-level officials wield more power and have higher public visibility, and thus have an even greater need for ethics training.

ENFORCEMENT POWERS

• Authorize OGE to investigate allegations of ethics violations for high-ranking employees (Presidential appointments with and without Senate confirmation, SES and Schedule C)

Since DAEOs are usually General Counsels, they are subordinate to some high-ranking agency officials — and are often themselves political appointees — raising concerns about political pressure affecting the effectiveness of any investigation they may conduct into high-ranking employees. Giving OGE the authority and responsibility to conduct those investigations would reduce the threat of political pressure and increase the chances that investigations are thorough.

• Clarify that the Director of OGE has the authority to conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses, compel production of documents and issue civil penalties for violations for high-ranking officials

To effectively conduct investigations and discipline high-ranking officials, OGE would need to be given several powers that it does not currently have. While OGE would be able to initiate investigations on its own, the agency should have the authority to respond to allegations brought by outside groups and a statutory duty to issue a public response to the complaint within a certain time frame. Furthermore, OGE’s decision not to open an investigation should provide a private cause of action to appeal that decision in court, reviewable under the standards of the Administrative Procedure Act. However, to ensure appropriate protections for the federal workforce, employees who are subject to discipline imposed by OGE should be able to appeal the decision to the Merit Systems Protection Board.

• Authorize OGE to conduct random audits of public and confidential financial disclosures to ensure the accuracy of the document

OGE is generally considered to have a compliance mentality — the agency will ensure that the proper forms are filed, but does not check the accuracy of the data. This raises
the specter that some financial disclosure will be incomplete or inaccurate. As a deterrent, OGE should have the authority to audit financial disclosures for cause and the responsibility to randomly and routinely audit a certain limited number of disclosures.

- **Authorize OGE to conduct random reviews of decisions by ethics officials for each agency**

  Agency ethics officials often consult OGE about ethics issues, but those officials have the authority to issue final decisions concerning many ethics matters. To ensure that agencies are applying the highest standards and coming to the best decisions, OGE should randomly audit agency ethics decisions.

- **Require OGE to approve waivers concerning CCOI laws**

  When offering a waiver exempting an employee from the application of CCOI laws in a specific situation, agency ethics officials must consult with OGE, but the ultimate decision remains with the agency official. To ensure that waivers are appropriate, and that agencies are not cutting corners, the law should require OGE to approve the waiver.

- **Require congressional review of current OGE decisions on “compartmentalization” and require congressional approval for any future decisions**

  OGE has the authority to “compartmentalize” agencies for the purpose of post-employment restrictions, meaning that high-ranking officials in a compartmentalized sub-agency or agency component may be able to lobby officials in other sub-agency or agency components. Given the potential for undermining congressional intent in establishing these post-employment provisions, Congress should have a role in reviewing and approving compartmentalization.